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Urban Evolutions:
The Fast, the Slow, and the Still
By GILLES DURANTON*
With the use of French and US data, new and systematic evidence is provided about
the rapid location changes of industries across cities (the fast). Cities are also
slowly moving up and down the urban hierarchy (the slow), while the size distribution of cities is skewed to the right and very stable (the still). The model proposed
here reproduces these three features. Small, innovation-driven shocks lead to the
churning of industries across cities. Then, cities slowly grow or decline following
net gains or losses of industries. These changes occur within a stable distribution.
The quantitative implications of the model are also explored. (JEL R12, R32)

A fundamental but much neglected issue in
urban development is the role played by the
churning of industries across locations. Jane
Jacobs (1970) provides early anecdotal evidence about what the key mechanisms at stake
might be. In the late nineteenth century, New
York City was the capital of the photographic
industry, whereas Rochester, New York, was
the leading city for precision instruments.
George Eastman, while working at improving
optical instruments in Rochester, invented an
emulsion-coating machine that enabled him to
mass-produce photographic dry plates. His
company soon took over the market for photographic film. As a consequence, Rochester replaced New York as the main center for the
industry. Rochester, 50 years later, was still the
capital of the US film industry, whereas New
York was that of the duplication industry. Then,
Haloid Company, a firm specialized in the manufacturing of photographic papers and operating

in the shadow of Eastman Kodak, came up with
a new process for making copies without the
need for developing. The process, called xerography, made Rochester the new capital of the
duplication industry in place of New York
(again), where the previous dominant technology, the varityper, was produced. These two
industries came to represent an important part of
Rochester’s employment.
Section I presents novel and systematic evidence that there is indeed considerable industrial churning across cities. Industries move and
cities experience rapid changes in the composition of their economic activity. This stylized
fact, the fast, is closely related to two betterknown features of urban evolutions: the slow,
where cities move slowly up and down the
distribution of city sizes as they grow or decline
relative to other cities; and the still, where the
size distributions of cities tend to be stable over
time and skewed to the right.
The model in Section II provides microeconomic foundations for the churning of industries across cities. Formally, it embeds an
extension of Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan
Helpman’s (1991) quality ladder model in an
urban framework. In each industry, research
firms try to invent the next step up the quality
ladder in order to reap monopoly profits. Research firms may be successful in their own
industry or may develop a new leading quality
in another industry. Local spillovers induce research firms in an industry to co-locate with
production in the same industry and in most
industries, successful innovators need to start
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Size Distributions as a Consequence of the Growth Process.” I am grateful to Vernon Henderson, Yannis Ioannides, Janet Kohlhase, Tomoya Mori, Henry Overman, John
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producing where they did their research. This
implies that own-industry innovations lead to a
change of monopoly but to no change of location for an industry. By contrast, cross-industry
innovations imply not only a change of monopoly but also, typically, a change of location,
since the old and new monopolies are not generally located in the same city. Hence, innovationdriven shocks provide the basis for the growth and
decline of cities so that urban evolutions result
from the aggregation of small industry-level
shocks.
The results derived in Section III show that,
over a specific time period, a city typically
experiences employment gains in some sectors
and losses in others. Since gains and losses
partially offset each other, net employment
changes in cities are smaller than gross employment flows, and cities move slowly up and
down the size distribution. Furthermore, these
changes occur within an approximately stable
right-skewed distribution of city sizes. Hence
the model can replicate the three stylized facts
above.
The quantitative predictions of the model are
explored in Section IV using simulations. The
model is calibrated to replicate French and US
city-size distributions. The simulations approximate the US distribution well. The model does
better than Zipf’s law according to a natural
efficiency criterion.1 For France, the performance is also good. Interestingly, the model can
replicate the nonregular features of the French
and US Zipf’s curves like their concavity, although it exaggerates them.
These systematic deviations can be reduced
or eliminated altogether by considering a natural extension of the model. In Section V, the
returns to innovative activities in cities are affected by their size: positively, through (reducedform) dynamic agglomeration economies, and
negatively, through crowding. When agglomeration economies dominate crowding, the probability of innovating in a city increases more
than proportionately to its size. This reduces the
Zipf’s coefficient in the upper tail and increases
it in the lower tail. Under empirically plausible
values for the trade-off between agglomeration

1
Zipf’s law refers to the well-known empirical claim
that the size distribution of cities follows a Pareto distribution with unitary exponent. See below for more information.
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economies and crowding (Stuart S. Rosenthal
and William C. Strange 2004), it is possible to
replicate the US and French urban systems very
closely.
There is a large urban growth literature that
builds on the trade-off between agglomeration
economies and crowding (see Marcus Berliant
and Ping Wang 2004, or J. Vernon Henderson
2006, for surveys). Like this paper, this literature often views purposeful innovative activity
as a key engine of urban growth. Its main emphasis, however, is on how the growth process
depends on urban agglomeration, and vice
versa, an issue that is intentionally left aside
here. On the other hand, the spatial churning of
industries, the slow mobility of cities in the
urban hierarchy, and their heterogeneity in population size are usually neglected in this
literature.2
A second important strand of literature,
which dates back to Herbert Simon (1955), has
sought to generate distributions of city sizes that
would obey Zipf’s law. This literature, recently
revived by the work of Xavier Gabaix (1999), is
successful at generating realistic and stable distributions of city sizes with some mobility
within them. It has two main limitations. First, it
ignores the churning of industries across cities,
the main focus of this paper. Second, and more
subtly, urban evolutions in this literature are
driven by ad hoc exogenous shocks: amenity
shocks in Gabaix (1999), preference shocks in
Juan-Carlos Córdoba (2003), and productivity
shocks in Jan Eeckhout (2004) and Esteban
Rossi-Hansberg and Mark L. J. Wright (forthcoming). By contrast, the model presented here
offers detailed microeconomic foundations for
technology shocks.3 Such microeconomic foundations are important because these shocks are
2
A possible exception is Duranton and Diego Puga
(2001), who examine the movements of firms from diversified to specialized cities in steady state. Their focus is
nonetheless different, since churning occurs across cities
that keep the same population and sectoral structure.
3
In a companion paper (Duranton 2006), a Zipf’s law
model with detailed microeconomic foundations is proposed. This companion paper builds on the product proliferation model of endogenous growth (Paul M. Romer 1990)
instead of its quality ladder version. This companion model
is unable to deal with the churning of industries—a crucial
focus of the present paper—since existing industries never
move. Furthermore, this Zipf’s law model does not examine
the higher moments of the city size distribution, nor does it
examine quantitatively the deviations from Zipf’s law.
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the fundamental drivers of the distribution of
city sizes in steady state. Furthermore, sound
foundations for these shocks should provide
important guidance for future empirical work
by telling us where and how to look for the
ultimate sources of urban growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section I provides systematic evidence about
the three stylized facts mentioned above. Section II proposes a simple benchmark model. It is
solved in Section III, where its main qualitative
features are discussed. Simulations results are
discussed in Section IV. The benchmark model
is then enriched in Section V, where more realistic
urban assumptions are introduced. Finally, the last
section contains some conclusions.
I. Three Stylized Facts about City Sizes

A. The Fast
Detailed evidence about the fast, the slow,
and the still of urban evolutions is provided for
French and US cities. For the United States, I
use employment data from the US Census Bureau County Business Patterns for 272 metropolitan areas between 1977 and 1997 at the
level of 70 two-digit sectors, and population
data for the same units from the US Census.4
For France, I used the Enquête Structure des
Emplois from the French Institute for National
Statistics. French employment data are collected at the level of 96 two-digit sectors for
plants with more than 20 employees and are
available for 217 French metropolitan areas
from 1985 to 1993.5
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It is useful to start with a comparison of the
location patterns of population and employment
in selected industries in the largest US cities
between 1977 and 1997. The first two columns
of Table 1 rank the ten largest US metropolitan
areas in 1977 and indicate in brackets their
changes in ranking with 1997. Changes over
this 20-year period were small, with only the
growth of the San Francisco area and the decline of Cleveland to be noted. This can be
contrasted with the much larger changes in employment rankings for three large industries in
the next three columns. In apparels (a low-tech
industry), most cities changed rank. Sometimes
the movements were quite large, with Washington losing 7 places while San Francisco gained
12. In transportation equipment (a mid-tech industry), there was some stability at the very top
(though big changes in absolute employment),
but New York and Cleveland dramatically
moved from third to twenty-third and from sixth
to twenty-first, respectively. Finally, instruments (a high-tech industry) also exhibits substantial changes over the 1977–1997 period.
Overall, Table 1 suggests much more variability
for sectoral employment than for aggregate population. This is shown formally by the last row of
the table, which sums all rank variations.
To examine the spatial churning of industries
in greater detail, an index of gross employment
reallocation across sectors within each city c
can be defined following the literature on industry dynamics (Steven J. Davis and John C.
Haltiwanger 1998). For each US city, this index
averages yearly relative employment gains and
losses over all sectors and years:
(1) Churn c

4

County-level data are aggregated into Metropolitan
Statistical Areas/Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas outside New England and into New England County
Metropolitan Areas in New England using year 2000 definitions. To look at churning, one needs sector-level data by
location, which are publicly available only at the county
level. Hence documenting the fast one is restricted to the
largest units, that is, metropolitan areas, which are counties
or aggregates of counties. However, to explore some implications of the model regarding city size distribution, it is
better to use a more complete sample of cities. This is what
I do below, where sector-level information is not needed.
Consistent definitions are used throughout the paper.
5
The possible (minor) problems caused by the employment cutoff are discussed in Pierre-Philippe Combes,
Thierry Magnac, and Jean-Marc Robin (2004), who also
provide a more detailed description of these data. There
were some data problems in 1988 in 15 cities. I excluded

⫽

1
20 ⫻ 70

冘 冘 兩e 共z, t ⫹e1兲共t兲⫺ e 共z, t兲兩 ,

1996

70

c

t ⫽ 1977 z ⫽ 1

c

c

where ec(z, t) (⬎0) is employment in metropolitan area c and sector z for year t. It is also
useful to compute an index of employment re-

them here (but will use their population data below when
looking at the distribution of city sizes in France). Finally,
note that only a short time period is available because of
data problems in 1984 and a change of industrial classification in 1994.
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TABLE 1—RANKINGS

AND

Rank in 1977 (and change in rank
between 1977 and 1997)
New York
Los Angeles
Chicago
Washington
Philadelphia
Boston
Detroit
San Francisco
Cleveland
Dallas
Total rank variation

CHANGES

FOR THE
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TEN LARGEST US METROPOLITAN AREAS, 1977

AND

1997

Total
population

Apparel

Transportation
equipment

Instruments

1 (0)
2 (0)
3 (0)
4 (0)
5 (⫹1)
6 (⫹1)
7 (⫹1)
8 (⫺3)
9 (⫹5)
10 (⫺1)
(12)

1 (⫹1)
2 (⫺1)
11 (⫺3)
13 (⫹7)
3 (⫹3)
4 (0)
10 (0)
15 (⫺12)
18 (⫹26)
5 (⫹4)
(57)

3 (⫹20)
2 (0)
8 (⫹4)
29 (⫹8)
13 (⫺3)
17 (⫹24)
1 (0)
9 (0)
6 (⫹15)
7 (⫺2)
(76)

2 (⫹2)
5 (⫺3)
4 (⫹5)
16 (⫺6)
7 (⫹4)
3 (⫺2)
20 (⫺1)
6 (⫺3)
12 (⫹6)
13 (⫺5)
(37)

Notes: The first number in each column is the 1977 ranking (among 272 metropolitan areas). It is followed (in parentheses)
by the change in ranking between 1977 and 1997 (where an increase is a decline). The final row sums the absolute value of
all the changes above. All calculations use the year 2000 definition of US metropolitan areas. Columns 3 to 5 give the ranking
(and the 1977–1997 change) for total employment in SIC23 (apparel and other textile products), SIC37 (transportation
equipment), and SIC38 (instruments and related products).
Source: US Census, County Business Patterns, and author’s calculations.

allocation for each US metropolitan area over
the 1977–1997 period:
1
(2) ⌬Emp c ⫽
20

冘

1996

t ⫽ 1977

兩e c 共t ⫹ 1兲 ⫺ e c 共t兲兩
,
e c 共t兲

where ec(t) is total employment in city c for year
t. Similar indices can be defined for French
cities between 1985 and 1993 by changing the
number of sectors and years.
By definition, Churnc is expected to be larger
than ⌬Empc. The interesting question is by how
much. The difference Churnc ⫺ ⌬Empc is
called “excess sector churning.” For the index
of gross city employment reallocation across
sectors, Churnc, the averages are 8.26 percent
for US cities and 11.40 percent for French cities. They are more than twice as large as the
averages of ⌬Empc, which are 4.10 percent for
US cities and 5.20 percent for French cities.
There is, thus, a large amount of excess sector
churning and in this sense the movement of
industries across cities is fast compared to the
slow movement of cities.
When repeating the same exercise for only
manufacturing sectors, I found an average of
9.81 percent for Churnc and 4.82 percent for
⌬Empc in the United States. The figures for
France are 12.24 and 6.62 percent, respectively.
This points at more sectoral mobility when only
manufacturing sectors are considered.

All of this churning cannot be the result of
sectoral change. To see this, an index of
changes in sectoral employment at the national
level can be computed:
(3) ⌬SecEmp
1
⫽
20 ⫻ 70

1兲 ⫺ e共z, t兲兩
,
冘 冘 兩e共z, t ⫹ e共t兲

1996

70

t ⫽ 1977 z ⫽ 1

where e(z, t) is employment in sector z for all
metropolitan areas in year t. Calculations show
that ⌬SecEmp is very close to 5 percent for both
France and the United States.6
To complement this analysis, I used Markov
transition matrices for employment across areas
in each sector. For each US metro area, I used
sectoral employment in 1977, 1982, 1987,
1992, and 1997. For these years, the distribution
of employment for each sector was divided into
four quartiles and the maximum likelihood
probability of moving between them was
computed. A convenient way to summarize the

6
More disaggregated studies typically indicate that sectoral change accounts for only a tiny part of the observed
employment churning (Davis and Haltiwanger 1998). In
this respect, and in absence of more detailed sectoral divisions, sectoral churning will be underestimated since many
changes of employment within finely defined sectors will
wash out at a more aggregated level.
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information is to compute the mean first passage
time from the lowest quartile to the highest.
This corresponds to the expected time a city in
the lowest quartile takes to reach the highest
quartile of employment in the sector (see Duncan Black and Henderson 2003 for details). In
the United States, the cross-sector average of
mean first passage time is 277 years. Despite
relatively short periods of five years, the transition matrices are stationary at a 5-percent confidence level for 66 of 70 sectors (including all
manufacturing sectors).
This mean first passage time of 277 years for
sectors should be compared to a mean first
passage time of 1,428 years for the population
of US metropolitan areas (see below for details). Viewed differently, over a five-year period, 97.1 percent of metropolitan areas in the
top quartile remain in the same cell, whereas
90.1 percent do so in the bottom quartile. For
industries in cities, the corresponding figures
are much lower at, on average, 89.3 percent and
75.1 percent, respectively.7 This suggests that
the mobility of employment in sectors is much
faster than that of city population.
A second interesting feature is that downward
mobility is faster than upward mobility. The
mean first passage time from the top cell to the
bottom is only 176 years, showing that within a
sector it takes longer to reach the top than to fall
from it. Interestingly, this faster downward mobility is driven by a number of factors consistent
with the model below. First, sectors can literally
fall from grace in some cities. Every five years,
1.5 percent of city sectors in the top decile fall
to the bottom, whereas less than 1 percent do
the opposite. Second, more mobility at the bottom of the distribution implies that any progression is easily reversed. Finally (and consistent
with the model below), note that cities with very
little employment in some industries tend to
remain with very little employment.
The same exercise can be conducted for
France, using 1985, 1989, and 1993. Given that

the population threshold for French cities in the
data is very low and that there is a threshold of
20 employees per plant, there are too many
zeroes for the analysis to be conducted meaningfully with the entire set of French data. The
sample is thus restricted to the largest 100 cities
and to the 32 industries for which less than 25
percent of these cities have zero employment.
The mean first passage time is 207 years from
bottom to top, and stationarity is not rejected in
29 industries. This is much faster than the mean
first passage time for city employment (446
years). As in the United States, downward mobility is also faster than upward mobility (a
mean first passage time of 154 years instead of
207).
These findings are consistent with previous
work by Black and Henderson (1999). They
compute mean first passage times for three
high-tech and three capital goods sectors across
US metropolitan areas (using a different data
source). They find that the mean first passage
from the bottom to the top cell is on average 90
years for high-tech sectors and 150 years for
capital goods sectors. In a more systematic analysis of industry mobility across cities, Mohammad Arzaghi and James C. Davis (2005) also
obtain results that are consistent with those
computed here.8 In detailed industry studies,
Mark Beardsell and Henderson (1999) and
Nancy E. Wallace and Donald W. Walls (2004)
examine the location patterns of the US information technology industry over time. Despite
different time frames and different definitions
for this industry, both studies find substantial
turbulence. According to Beardsell and Henderson (1999), mean first passage time from the
lowest to the highest cell (of four) for a typical
US metropolitan area is only 39 years. In their
detailed examination of employment changes
by location between 1989 and 2002, Wallace
and Walls (2004) find both big winners and big
losers. While employment grew nationally by
20 percent in the industry over that period, it

7
Obviously these figures depend on the cutoffs. Taking
a more restrictive set of cutoffs (say the fifth, fifteenth, and
fourtieth centile instead of the twenty-fifth, fiftieth, and
seventy-fifth) yields longer mean first passage times (427
years for sectors and 4,027 years for city population). However, the much faster relative mobility of city sectors is
robust to the choice of cutoff. If anything, taking smaller
cells at the top magnifies the results reported above.

8
Using a radically different approach for US states between 1972 and 1992, Guy Dumais, Glenn Ellison, and
Edward L. Glaeser (2002) find very small changes in the
geographic concentration of most industries, but very significant changes in where they concentrate. This again suggests that industries, even the more concentrated ones, are
quite mobile over time. These results are confirmed by
Salvador Barrios et al. (2005) for two European countries.
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grew by nearly half or more in Washington, DC,
San Francisco, and Atlanta, despite their high
initial bases. Conversely, Dutchess, New York,
and Colorado Springs (twenty-first and twentythird in 1989) lost roughly half of their employment in this sector over the same period. All this
suggests, again, substantial industry mobility.
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ployment churning” and is equal to 1.34 percent
for the United States and 1.88 percent for
France. Put differently, employment changes in
cities are about 50 percent larger than they need
to be to accommodate the changes in aggregate
metropolitan employment.
C. The Still

B. The Slow
These high levels of industry churning must
be contrasted with much slower changes in citywide employment. In their analysis of 39
French cities between 1876 and 1990, Jonathan
Eaton and Zvi Eckstein (1997) use Markov transition matrices. They assess mobility directly by
looking at the off diagonal terms. They find that
about 20 percent of cities change cell (among
six) every 20 years or so—arguably a small
proportion. Black and Henderson (2003) also
find fairly low levels of mobility for 282 US
metropolitan areas between 1900 and 1990,
since only about 15 percent of them change cell
(among five) every ten years.
To complete this evidence and to provide a
benchmark for the figures about industry mobility reported above, the transition matrix analysis can be repeated for city-level data. The
mean first passage time is 1,428 years for the
United States and 446 years for France.9 In both
cases, this implies far less mobility than for
sectors. Despite slower mobility, some aggregate employment churning is nonetheless observed. To evidence this, the average index of
employment changes for US metropolitan areas
(see equation (2)) is compared to an index of
employment change for all metro areas:
(4) ⌬UrbEmp ⫽

1
20

冘

1996

t ⫽ 1977

兩e共t ⫹ 1兲 ⫺ e共t兲兩
,
e共t兲

where e(t) is the employment of all metropolitan
areas in year t. A similar index can be defined
for France between 1985 and 1993. ⌬UrbEmp
is equal to 2.77 percent for the United States
and 3.32 percent for France. The difference
between (2) and (4) can be called “excess em-

9
These two figures cannot be compared directly because
the size thresholds differ widely for the two countries. Note
also that, in both cases, stationarity is not rejected.

To examine the stability of size distribution
of French urban areas, Eaton and Eckstein
(1997) use three different approaches. After
normalizing the overall French urban population, they first compute the Lorenz curves of the
spatial Gini coefficients for French urban areas
for each census year. The Lorenz curves are
remarkably close to each other. Second, for
each year of data they estimate
(5)
log Rankc ⫽ Constant ⫺  log Sizec ⫹ errorc ,
where c is a subindex for cities. They find that
, the Zipf’s coefficient, remains approximately
constant over time. Finally, they assume that
cities follow a first-order Markov transition process, estimate the transition probabilities between different size cells, and compute the ergodic
probability distribution. This ergodic distribution
is very close to the current distribution.
For US metropolitan areas, Black and Henderson (2003) find that their probability distribution function in 1990 is remarkably close to
that in 1900. When estimating equation (5) for
each decade, the Zipf’s coefficient is close to
constant over time. Black and Henderson
(2003) estimate transitions probabilities for a
Markov process as well. Like Eaton and Eckstein (1997) on French data, they find that the
1990 distribution is very close to the ergodic
distribution. These findings broadly confirm
those of Linda Harris Dobkins and Yannis M.
Ioannides (2000), who use different US data.
D. Some Links
The link between the last two stylized facts,
the still and the slow, is straightforward. Cities can be thought of as experiencing population shocks within a steady-state distribution.
The link between industry mobility and city
population changes deserves closer scrutiny.
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Population changes in cities could well be the
consequence of local industry shocks, but this
need not be the case. Causality could in principle run in the opposite direction. Anecdotal
evidence suggests nonetheless that technology
shocks in industries constitute an important
channel for urban growth and decline. Extreme
examples include, among others, the demise of
the steel industry in Pittsburgh and the rise of
Internet-related industries in San Jose.
Beyond anecdotal evidence, Edward N.
Coulson (1999) and Gerald A. Carlino, Robert
H. DeFina, and Keith Sill (2001) provide more
systematic evidence on the role of industry
shocks to explain US metropolitan employment
fluctuations. Using a time series methodology to
disentangle common shocks and sector-level
shocks locally, both papers attribute an overwhelming share of local fluctuations to the latter. These findings complement those of Olivier
Jean Blanchard and Lawrence F. Katz (1992),
showing that in- and out-migration is the main
channel of adjustment to local shocks in US
states.
II. The Model

The model is a variation of Grossman and
Helpman’s (1991) quality ladder model of
growth which is embedded below in an urban
framework. Consider an economy with a large
(discrete) number of industries, n, each of which
produces one good that can potentially be supplied in an infinite number of qualities.10 Quality j of good z is given by qj(z) ⫽ ␦j , with ␦ ⬎
1. At time t ⫽ 0, the quality of all goods is
normalized to unity so that any good must be
improved j times to reach quality j. Quality
improvements stem from research investments,
which are described below.
A. Preferences
Consider a population of long-lived households whose mass is normalized to one and
whose instantaneous utility is given by

10

Here, there is a small difference with Grossman and
Helpman (1991): a discrete set of industries instead of a
continuum. This prevents the law of large numbers from
applying at the level of individual cities.

冘
n

(6)

u共t兲 ⬅

z⫽1

冋冘

1
log
n
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册

j 共z,t兲

qj(z)dj(z, t) ,

j⫽1

where dj(z, t) is the consumption of quality j of
good z at time t, and j( z, t) its highest available
quality at time t. For reasons made clear below,
location indices can be ignored for the time
being. Total expenditure is

冘 冘 p 共z, t兲d 共z, t兲,
j 共z,t兲

n

(7)

E共t兲 ⬅

j

j

z⫽1 j⫽1

where pj(z, t) is the price of quality j of good z
at time t. The objective of consumers is to
maximize the discounted sum of their future
instantaneous utilities
U⬅

(8)

冕

⬁

u共  兲e ⫺  d  ,

0

subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
(9)

冕

⬁

E共  兲e ⫺R共  兲 d  ⱕ W共0兲,

0

where R() is the cumulative interest factor between 0 and , and W(0) is the net present value
of the stream of income plus the initial asset
holdings at t ⫽ 0.
The maximization of the consumers’ program
can be performed in two stages. First, allocate
instantaneous expenditure, E(t), to maximize u(t)
and then choose the intertemporal allocation of
expenditure. The maximization of instantaneous
utility (6) for any positive level of consumption
expenditure implies equal shares of expenditure
across industries. Then, to solve for the allocation
of expenditure within industries, define J(z, t) ⬅
Argminjⱕ j(z,t)(pj(z, t)/qj (z)), the quality of good z
for which the ratio of price to quality is the lowest.
When J(z, t) is unique (and it is so in equilibrium),
demand in industry z is then given by

再

E(t)
for j ⫽ J(z, t),
(10) d j 共z, t兲 ⫽ np j (z, t)
0
otherwise.
Inserting these demands into (6) yields
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1
(11) u共t兲 ⫽
n

冘 关log E共t兲 ⫺ log n
n

z⫽1

unique quality leader, this leader is also the only
active firm in the industry: j(z, t) ⫽ J(z, t).
Using p ⫽ ␦w and pd ⫽ 1, the profit of any
industry leader is thus

⫹ log qJ 共z, t兲 ⫺ log pJ 共z, t兲兴,
(13)
where pJ(z, t) and qJ(z, t) are the price and
quality of J(z, t), respectively. Equation (11)
can now be used to solve the optimal consumption path whose solution is characterized by
(12)

Ė/E ⫽ Ṙ ⫺  ,

together with the budget constraint and a transversality condition. After normalizing total expenditure E(t) to n through the choice of
numéraire, equation (12) implies Ṙ ⫽ , that is,
the nominal interest rate is always equal to the
subjective discount rate.
B. Technology
As is standard in quality ladder models of
growth, there is competition in each industry to
innovate and occupy the next step up the quality
ladder. Research is performed by research firms
(which produce no output in equilibrium). Any
successful innovator is rewarded with a patent
giving it a monopoly right over the production of this quality, j(z, 䡠 ). This patent cannot be licensed, and it expires only when yet
another successful innovator manages to develop the following quality step. Thus, there is
free entry among price-setting oligopolists for
qualities below j(z, t). In all industries and
irrespective of quality, producers need one unit
of labor to produce one unit of good.
Free entry and unit marginal costs imply that
for any nonleading quality, j ⬍ j(z, t), the price,
pj(z, t), is equal to the wage rate, w(t). Together
with (10), this implies that any quality leader in
industry z has a revenue pj(z, t)dj(z, t) ⫽ E(t)/
n ⫽ 1 when pj(z, t)/qj(z, t) ⱕ pj⫺ 1(z, t)/qj⫺ 1(z,
t), that is, when pj(z, t) ⱕ ␦w(t). Prices above
␦w(t) imply zero demand for the industry’s
leading quality. Hence, with unit elastic demand, any industry leader maximizes its profits
by selling its quality at the limit price p ⫽ ␦w.
Since the assumptions about product development ensure that in every industry there is a
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 ⫽ 共 p ⫺ w兲d ⫽ 1 ⫺

1
.
␦

There is free entry in the race to be the next
leader in each industry. A research firm k in
industry z, by investing k(z) units of research
labor for a time interval of length dt to work on
the highest existing quality, j( z, t), succeeds in
inventing the next step up the quality ladder in
this industry, j(z, t) ⫹ 1, with probability ␤kdt.
Thus, as in Grossman and Helpman (1991),
research firms use the state-of-the-art technology j(z, t) in an industry as a base to invent the
next step up the quality ladder in the same
industry.11
There is, however, a slight difference with
Grossman and Helpman’s (1991) framework
regarding the research technology. A research
effort targeted at improving industry z may be
successful, not only in this particular industry
(as just described), but also in any other industry because of serendipity in the research process. Frederic M. Scherer (1984) provides very
strong empirical support regarding the pervasiveness of such cross-industry innovations.12
Formally, a research firm k in industry z, by
investing k(z) units of research labor over dt,
succeeds in inventing the next step up the quality ladder in industry z⬘ ⫽ z with probability
␥kdt with ␥ ⬍ ␤.

11

As in most endogenous growth models, innovations
have both a private good dimension (patenting) and a public
good aspect (increase of own-industry stock of knowledge).
Note, also, that without any cost advantage in research,
industry leaders do not attempt to innovate since, in case of
success, the incremental profit would be less than that of a
new entrant. Thus, in equilibrium, research is performed
only by would-be entrants.
12
So far, after the choice of a discrete number of industries as opposed to a continuum, this is only the second
difference with Grossman and Helpman (1991). In their
setting, none of these differences would change their results
in any meaningful way. In a spatial setting, however, the
possibility of cross-industry innovations is crucial to allow
a research firm located in a given city to “capture” an
industry located in another city, and thus provides a reason
for city size to change.
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In total, a research firm k in industry z, which
invests k(z) over dt, expects to invent the next
step up the quality ladder in industry z with
probability ␤k(z)dt and in each of the other
industries with probability ␥k(z)dt. After denoting (z) ⬅ 兰 k(z) dk, the sum of all research
investments made by research firms in industry
z, the probability of an innovation taking place
in industry z over dt is (z)dt, where
(14)

 共z兲 ⬅ ␤ 共z兲 ⫹ ␥

冘 共z⬘兲.

z⬘⫽z

Note that this probability increases in both the
industry and the aggregate research efforts.13
For the sake of clarity, the assumptions presented here stick as closely as possible to the
canonical model of Schumpeterian growth developed by Grossman and Helpman (1991): a
multi-industry model where firms compete and
invest in research in order to reap the monopoly
profits associated with the highest quality. Selfsustaining and nonexplosive growth is possible
since new innovations are neither more difficult
nor easier than past ones. This well-known
model can now be embedded in a very simple
urban setting.
C. Cities
Consider m cities across which final goods
are freely tradable. There are many more industries than cities: n Ⰷ m. Workers are freely
mobile, and there are neither advantages nor
costs to city size so that any city can accommodate any number of workers at zero cost. This
last assumption is relaxed in Section V.
Regarding research, recall that a quality improvement in an industry requires the knowledge associated with the leading quality. In turn,
this knowledge is available only to research
firms located in the same city as the industry
leader. A possible justification is that one may
13
On a more technical note, we consider only the case of
a single innovation taking place between t and t ⫹ dt.
Following a classical reasoning in the literature, the case of
two or more innovations taking place between t and t ⫹ dt
can be neglected. Formally, the probability of exactly k
innovation happening over dt is given by (dt)ke⫺dt/k!. The
time interval dt can be made arbitrarily small. Consequently, the probability of two or more innovations taking
place between t and t ⫹ dt can be neglected since it is a
function of (dt)2 and terms of higher order.
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learn about leading technologies only by observing how industry leaders produce, through
small talk with workers involved in production,
or by being involved indirectly in production as
supplier. All this requires physical proximity.
This assumption of local knowledge spillovers
has received ample empirical support. (See
Rosenthal and Strange (2004) for a review of
the literature.)
Turning to the location of production, note
that a mechanism is needed to allow industries
to change location. The possible mobility of all
industries may, however, lead cities to lose all
their industries and thus fall into a zero population trap. The simplest way to satisfy these
modeling requirements is to assume that each
industry is of one of two types: first-nature or
second-nature.
First-nature industries are immobile. They
provide both a first-nature justification for the
existence of cities and a way by which to identify them. For simplicity, each city hosts one
such industry. Any successful innovator in a
first-nature industry, if located in a different
city, must then relocate at no cost to implement
its innovation. One may think of some natural
advantages, like a primary resource, that tie
these industries to some particular cities. For
instance, any improvement in coal extraction
can be implemented only close to coal fields.
The remaining n ⫺ m industries are labeled
second-nature, in the sense that production must
take place where the last quality innovation
occurred. A possible justification for this assumption is that, in this type of industries, the
production of the highest quality depends on the
many workers who took part in the innovation.
Although they are individually freely mobile,
coordinating the relocation of these workers to a
particular city may be difficult.14 In this respect,
note that in many industries where quality innovations are rather complex, such as in the
electronics industry, the highest-quality products are nearly always manufactured close to the
research centers where they were developed
(see Masahisa Fujita and Ryoichi Ishii 1998 for
evidence regarding Japanese electronics firms).
In summary, first-nature industries are “anchors” that prevent cities from disappearing,

14
Alternatively, assume that state-of-the-art knowledge
is too complex to be codified and exported to another city.
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whereas second-nature industries provide a reason for the growth and decline of cities.15
III. Steady-State Growth and City Size
Distribution

A. Steady-State Economic Growth
In absence of costs or benefits to city size,
profits are independent of location. The model
can thus be solved for research and growth
independently from the urban structure. Denote
by v the stock market value of an industry
leader. If this stock market value is the same
across industries (which is the case at the symmetric equilibrium), then firm k, at a cost of
wk(z)dt, can expect to win (␤ ⫹ (n ⫺ 1)␥) ⫻
k(z) ⫻ vdt. Profit maximization by research
firms implies that, in equilibrium,
(15)

v⫽

w
.
␤ ⫹ 共n ⫺ 1兲 ␥

Turning to the stock market valuation of
firms, industry leaders pay a dividend dt over
the period dt since their profits are not reinvested in research. The value of an industry
leader appreciates by v̇dt when no research firm
succeeds in inventing the next step up the quality ladder. This occurs with probability 1 ⫺
( z)dt. In the opposite case, when an innovation
takes place in the industry, the value of its
leader goes to zero. This loss of v occurs with
probability (z)dt. Summing these terms (and
neglecting the terms in (dt)2) implies that the
(instantaneous) expected yield for a shareholder
is  ⫹ v̇ ⫺ (z)v. Investing in any firm is risky,
but perfect diversification is possible since there
is always one leader, so that profit is constant in
each industry. Hence, firms are valued so that
their expected stock market return is equal to

15
Although this dichotomy between first- and secondnature industries may seem a bit extreme, it captures in a
stylized way the existing opposition between knowledgedriven and more footloose industries, on the one hand, and
those bound by natural resources, on the other. Several other
mechanisms could have generated results, similar to those
below, albeit in a more complicated way. For instance, the
existence of a durable stock of housing with the possibility
of luring away a few industries (at a small cost) would also
prevent cities from disappearing.
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the safe interest rate, Ṙ, which is itself equal to
the subjective discount rate, . Consequently

 ⫹ v̇
⫺  共z兲 ⫽  .
v

(16)

Equations (13), (15), and (16) imply the following no-arbitrage equation:
(17)

冉 冊

1 ␤ ⫹ 共n ⫺ 1兲␥
ẇ
⫹ 1⫺
⫽ 共z兲 ⫹ .
w
␦
w

In steady state, equations (14)–(16) imply a
symmetric research effort in all industries:
(z) ⫽ . The aggregate probability of an innovation taking place in an industry is then
(z) ⫽  ⫽ (␤ ⫹ (n ⫺ 1)␥). After inserting this
in equation (17), rearranging yields the following differential equation guiding (nominal)
wages:
(18)  ⫽

冉 冊

ẇ
1
1 1
⫹ 1⫺
␤ ⫹ 共n ⫺ 1兲 ␥ w
␦ w
⫺


.
␤ ⫹ 共n ⫺ 1兲 ␥

This no-arbitrage condition is such that higher
wages, which make research more expensive,
have a negative effect on employment in research. Furthermore, a higher efficiency of research (␤ or ␥) raises returns to this activity and
thus employment therein. Finally, an increase in
the discount rate, , is equivalent to an increase
in interest rate. This lowers the net present value
of future profits and thus reduces employment
in research.
The model is closed by equating labor market
demand and supply. Recall that each monopoly
employs 1/(␦w) units of labor and that research
employment is the same in all industries. Consequently, aggregate labor demand is equal to
n[1/(␦w) ⫹ ]. Since aggregate labor supply is
inelastic and equal to one, labor market clearing
implies
(19)

⫽

1
1
⫺
.
n ␦w

The evolution of the economy is depicted in
Figure 1. The (NN) locus is the no-arbitrage
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In steady state, the instantaneous probability of
an innovation taking place in the economy over a
period dt is ndt. Using equation (14), this is equal
to (␤ ⫹ (n ⫺ 1))ndt, with  given by (21). Each
innovation then increases the aggregate qualityadjusted output by (␦ ⫺ 1)/n. After simplification,
the expected growth rate, g, of quality-adjusted
output in the economy over dt is

(N)

1
n

(L)

(22) g output ⫽ n ⫻

S
(L)

0

w

␦⫺1
n

冉 冊冋

⫽ 1⫺

冉

冊 册

␤⫺␥
1
(␦ ⫺ 1) ␥ ⫹
⫺ .
␦
n

(N)

FIGURE 1. DETERMINATION

OF THE

EQUILIBRIUM

condition (18) under ẇ ⫽ 0, and the (LL) locus
is the labor market clearing condition (19). The
economy must always lie along (LL) for the
labor market to clear. For values of w below
(NN), wages and research employment would
fall to zero. Since expenditure is constant, expected profits must rise above research costs, a
contradiction with free entry in research. A similar argument applies for values of w above
(NN). The economy must thus always be in
steady state at point S.
The steady-state values of w and  solve
equations (18) and (19) with ẇ ⫽ 0:
(20)

(21)  ⫽

w⫽

1
1

⫹
n ␤ ⫹ 共n ⫺ 1兲 ␥

,

冉 冊


1
1
1⫺
⫺
.
n
␦
关 ␤ ⫹ 共n ⫺ 1兲 ␥ 兴 ␦

Note first that the steady state is characterized
by constant employment in each industry for
both production and research, as well as constant nominal wages: with aggregate expenditure normalized to n, consumers benefit
from growth through lower quality-adjusted
prices. As usual in the endogenous growth
literature, the subjective discount rate must be
low enough, i.e.,  ⱕ ( ␦ ⫺ 1)[ ␤ ⫹ (n ⫺
1) ␥ ]/n, for research employment to be positive.

This expected growth rate is increasing with the
size of the quality improvements, ␦. There is a
direct effect caused by larger quality improvements and an indirect effect, whereby larger
improvements imply higher profits and thus
stronger incentives to do research. The growth
rate also increases with ␤ and ␥, the two efficiency parameters of research. It is also obviously decreasing with the rate of time
preference, . More interestingly, growth decreases with the number of industries (keeping
population constant). This is a dilution effect:
with more industries, a research investment has
a probability of success, ␤, to yield a monopoly
over a smaller part of the economy, 1/n, and a
probability of success, ␥ (lower than ␤), over a
larger part of the economy, (n ⫺ 1)/n.
B. Steady State of the Probability Distribution
of City Sizes
Turning to city sizes, recall that each firm
with a monopoly over the highest quality in an
industry is the sole producer in this industry.
Furthermore, because of local spillovers, research is geographically tied to production.
Consequently, symmetry across industries and
free worker mobility imply that the population
of a city is 1/n times its number of monopolies.
Thus, the latter quantity is a sufficient statistic
to describe a city. As a shorthand, the number of
active industries in a city is referred to as its
size.
To explore the properties of the model with
respect to the size distribution of cities, I first
solve analytically for the steady state of the
probability distribution. This is a situation
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where the number of cities of any size is expected to stay constant. More formally, it is
such that
(23)

E关m i 共t ⫹ dt兲兴 ⫺ m i 共t兲 ⫽ 0,

where mi(t) is the number of cities with i industries at time t. Note that this corresponds to a
limit case for which cities would be perfectly
divisible. In particular, condition (23) imposes
point-wise stationarity, which cannot generally
be satisfied with a finite discrete number of
cities. This limit case is nonetheless a very
useful approximation to understand the working
of the model and to exhibit its main properties.
A number of other properties, such as convergence toward steady state and the fluctuations
around it when cities are not divisible, are explored by means of simulations in Section IV.
Note first that in absence of cross-industry
innovation between t and t ⫹ dt, the urban
structure is left unchanged. Changes in the size
distribution of cities happen only when a second-nature industry is improved by a research
firm located in a different city. In this case, a
city loses an industry while another gains one.
Conditional on the occurrence of a crossindustry innovation between t and t ⫹ dt, the
number of cities of size 1, m1, increases by one
unit when a second-nature industry located in a
city of size 2 is successfully improved by research in an industry located in another city of
size 2 or above. All n(n ⫺ 1) possible crossindustry innovations occur with the same probability. Since there are m2 second-nature
industries in cities of size 2, each of which can
each be improved by one of n ⫺ m1 ⫺ 2 other
industries, the conditional probability of this
event is thus
(24)

m 2 ⫻ 共n ⫺ m 1 ⫺ 2兲
.
n共n ⫺ 1兲

Again, because dt can be made arbitrarily small,
the terms in (dt)2 and higher order can be neglected. Hence, cases like that of a city of size
3 losing its two second-nature industries over dt
can be neglected so that equation (24) accounts
for all possible increases in m1.
The number of cities of size 1, m1, declines
by one unit when a second-nature industry, not
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located in a city of size 2, is successfully improved by research in a city of size 1. Since
there are n ⫺ m ⫺ m2 such industries that can be
captured by m1 industries in cities of size 1, this
event occurs with the conditional probability
(25)

共n ⫺ m ⫺ m 2 兲 ⫻ m 1
.
n共n ⫺ 1兲

In the steady state defined by (23), the probability of having one more city of size 1 must
equal that of having one less city of the same
size. Equality of (24) and (25) implies
(26)

m2 ⫽

n⫺m
m .
n⫺2 1

In Appendix A, the reasoning is generalized
to cities of size i ⱖ 2. For any i ⱖ 1, equation
(23) then becomes
(27) i共n ⫺ i ⫺ 1兲m i ⫹ 1 ⫽ 关共2i ⫺ 1兲n
⫺ im ⫺ 2i共i ⫺ 1兲兴m i
⫺ 共i ⫺ 1兲共n ⫺ m ⫺ i ⫹ 2兲m i ⫺ 1 .
Note that (26) is a special case of (27) for which
i ⫽ 1. Appendix A also shows that the sequence
defined by equation (27) admits the following
closed-form solution:
(28)
mi ⫽

m共m ⫺ 1兲
n⫺1

写

j ⫽ m⫺2

j⫽1

n⫹1⫺m⫺i⫹j
.
n⫺m⫹j

The first important property of equation (28)
is that the steady state of the probability distribution is fully characterized by its numbers of
cities and industries, m and n. The other parameters of the model affect only the growth rate of
output: a more innovative research sector
(higher ␤ and ␥), larger quality improvements
(higher ␦), and a higher supply of investment
(lower ) all lead to higher growth. In turn,
higher growth means a faster convergence toward steady state. However, this steady state is
itself determined solely by how many cities are
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C. Properties of the Steady State: The Fast

FIGURE 2. PLOT OF THE STEADY STATE
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION

OF THE

Notes: The figure plots equation (28) with m ⫽ 232 cities
and n ⫽ 1,500 industries (each with 22,800 workers). These
values are the same as those used below to replicate the
French urban system.

competing for the existing industries. A small
number of external parameters will turn out to
be a very useful property to assess the model
quantitatively in Section IV. Nonetheless putting more structure in the modeling of cities will
lead to qualify this result in Section V.
The second important property of equation
(28) is that mi decreases monotonically with i.
As shown in greater detail below, this result is
driven by the fact that larger cities have more
second-nature industries to lose at home and
fewer to gain from outside than smaller cities.
Hence, the expected growth rate of larger cities
is lower and, in turn, there are fewer of them in
steady state. The precise shape of the distribution in (28) is also explored more in depth
below. To fix ideas at this stage, it is nonetheless useful to represent equation (28) in a log
rank–log size plot. Figure 2 does this for m ⫽
232 cities and n ⫽ 1,500 industries (each with
22,800 workers). These parameter values correspond to those used in Section IV to replicate
the French city size distribution.16
16

This graph must be read with some caution. Recall
that the steady state of the probability distribution ignores
the indivisibility of cities. Consequently, the size corresponding to log Rank ⫽ 0 in Figure 2 is that of the
fractional city of rank 1. There are other larger fractional

According to the model, over a given time
period, industries should be experiencing greater
turbulence than cities, because the growth of a
given city is the sum of the industries it gains
minus the industries it loses. Over a given period,
cities will, in general, experience both gains and
losses of industries. Consequently, the sum of
their employment gains and losses across industries should be larger than their overall population
change. This prediction is consistent with the evidence presented in Section I.17
Second, according to the core mechanism of
the model, more investment in research should
lead industries to move up the quality ladder
faster, and faster progress should be associated
with more spatial mobility. In their study of the
determinants of industry mobility in the United
States, Arzaghi and Davis (2005) find some
robust support in this direction. The spatial mobility of industries appears to be strongly associated with their employment share of scientists
and engineers and with their expenditure share
in R&D. There is also a strong positive association between the mobility of industries and
their total factor productivity.
Third, the growth in industry-city employment should be negatively related to its initial
level. This is because industry mobility involves
a city with an established industry losing it and
a city without prior employment in this industry
gaining it. In his analysis of employment
changes by sector across US metropolitan areas,
Curtis J. Simon (2004) finds a strong negative
correlation between initial sector employment
and its subsequent growth.
Finally, the model also implies that larger
cities are more likely both to lose and gain
industries so that industry churning should in-

cities of rank 0.99, 0.98, etc. Hence, the fractional city of
rank 1 is expected to be smaller than the largest indivisible
city. A similar distortion, albeit smaller, also exists for cities
of rank 2 and below. Unsurprisingly, in Section IV, the plot
of the outcome of the simulations using the same parameter
values (Figure 3, panel A) exhibits a larger largest city, a
slightly larger second largest city, etc., than Figure 2.
17
This is consistent with the microfoundations of the
model, R. Jason Faberman (2005), in his study of employment dynamics in cities, finds that high employment growth
in cities is associated with a strong presence of young
establishments that tend to experience fast employment
growth.
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crease with city size. Furthermore, when a
cross-industry innovation takes place in a city,
the likelihood that the improved industry is already located there increases with the size of
that city. To take an extreme case, a city of size
n ⫺ m ⫹ 1 can no longer grow since it already
hosts all second-nature industries. For this city,
the probability of losing an industry is also
small, since it can occur only through crossindustry innovation originating from a firstnature industry in another city. More generally,
this own-size effect implies that the probability
of gaining and losing industries increases less
than proportionately with city size.18
To test this important prediction, I regressed
the log of the index of sectoral reallocation for
each US metropolitan area between 1977 and
1997 (as defined by equation (1)) on the log of
city employment in 1977. Since the index of
sectoral reallocation is normalized by city population, a coefficient above ⫺1 signifies an increase in reallocation with city size. If this
increase is less than proportional to city size,
this coefficient should also be below zero. The
results are supportive of the prediction, since
the coefficient is ⫺0.21 with a standard error of
0.016. When restricting the analysis to manufacturing industries, the coefficient is ⫺0.30
with a standard error of 0.016. Reproducing the
same exercise for 217 French cities between
1985 and 1993 yields significant coefficients of
⫺0.20 for all industries and ⫺0.14 for manufacturing only.
D. Properties of the Steady State: The Slow
Following industry churning, cities in the
model experience small positive or negative
shocks, driving them slowly up or down the
urban hierarchy. This prediction is obviously
consistent with the slow mobility of cities within
their distribution documented in Section I.
Beyond this, the model also predicts that over
a period of time, there should be a distribution
of growth rates across cities. Some cities will
receive many new industries and grow a lot.
Others, on the contrary, will lose many industries and experience a strong decline. By the law
18
Going against this is the fact that first-nature industries
cannot be lost and are relatively more important in small
cities. However, the own-size effect can be shown to dominate in the upper tail.
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of large numbers, however, most cities should
receive both positive and negative shocks and
enjoy a rate of growth close to the mean. To
verify this prediction (as well as all the predictions that follow and do not involve the sectoral
composition of cities), it is preferable to use the
most comprehensive sample of cities. I thus use
data for 232 French urban areas (the same sample as in Section I after reintegrating the 15
cities with data problems at the sectoral level)
and 922 US metropolitan and micropolitan areas (rather than the 272 metropolitan areas used
above).19 In both countries, a nonparametric
estimation of the probability distribution function for city growth rates yields a single-peaked
distribution skewed to the right.
It is also possible to compute the expected
growth rate of cities as a function of their size.
Conditional on a cross-industry innovation taking place, the probability of a city with i industries gaining an industry is equal to the
probability of the innovation taking place there,
i/n, multiplied by the probability of the improved industry being a second-nature industry
originally located in another city, (n ⫺ m ⫺ i ⫹
1)/(n ⫺ 1). By the same token, the probability of
losing an industry is equal to [(i ⫺ 1)/(n ⫺ 1)]
⫻ [(n ⫺ i)/n]. After simplification, the conditional expected growth of a city is
(29)

g共i兲 ⫽

n ⫺ im
.
共n ⫺ 1兲ni

This quantity decreases with i. Hence, the
model predicts that city growth should be negatively correlated with size.20
The relationship between the growth and size
of cities has been often investigated. Mean reversion, that is, a negative effect of initial size
on subsequent growth, is a pervasive finding in the

19

As defined by the US Census Bureau, micropolitan
areas must have an urban cluster with a population between
10,000 and 50,000. Micropolitan areas do not overlap with
metropolitan areas and are smaller than counties, rather than
entire counties or aggregates thereof. With consistent definitions for metropolitan areas, micropolitan areas can thus
be viewed as an addition of smaller cities to the original
sample.
20
Note, however, that when n is large, the range for g
may be small. As shown below in the simulations, for a
realistic amount of churning across cities, the growth rate of
most (if not all) cities may not appear to be significantly
different from zero over a decade.
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literature (see Gabaix and Ioannides 2004 for a
discussion). Black and Henderson (2003) find
strong mean reversion for US metropolitan areas in their decade-by-decade analysis covering
the twentieth century. They confirm earlier findings by Glaeser, José A. Scheinkman, and Andrei Shleifer (1995), who find that mean
reversion also holds when controlling for other
factors associated with urban growth. For corroboration, the same exercise can be conducted
for the 232 largest French metropolitan areas
between 1990 and 1999. When regressing average annual growth on log initial population, the
coefficient is highly significant at ⫺0.11.
The model also provides a prediction regarding the variance of the growth of cities. Because
in large cities cross-industry innovations are
more likely to improve industries that are already located there, the variance of city growth
is expected to decline with size. Formally, conditional on a cross-industry innovation taking
place, the variance of the growth of a city of
size i is
(30)  2 共i兲 ⫽

冉

i n⫺m⫺i⫹1 i⫹1
⫺1
n
n⫺1
i
⫹

⫽

冉

i⫺1 n⫺i i⫺1
⫺1
n⫺1 n
i

冊

冊

relative changes, as predicted by the model. To
be more systematic, I followed Overman and
Ioannides (2001) and regressed the “variance”
of the growth of each city for the 1990s (i.e., the
square of its growth minus the cross-city mean)
on the log of its initial size and its square. For
both French and US cities, the two coefficients
have the expected sign and are highly significant, indicating a decreasing, convex relationship between the variance of city growth and
initial size.
E. Properties of the Steady State: The Still
The existence of a steady state with smallscale fluctuations around it reproduces the stability of the distribution of city sizes. The steady
state characterized by equation (28) is also
skewed. To investigate this skewness more in
depth, mi and mi ⫹ 1 can be written using equation (28). Simple algebra then yields
(31)

2

2

i共2n ⫺ m ⫹ 2 ⫺ 2i兲 ⫺ n
.
n共n ⫺ 1兲i

Simple algebra then shows that this variance is
a decreasing and convex function of city size, i.
The relationship between the variance of the
growth rate of city population and the initial
size is far less frequently investigated than the
growth-size relationship. Henry G. Overman
and Ioannides (2001) find that second-tier cities
experience more mobility than first-tier cities in
the United States, while Eaton and Eckstein
(1997) find a similar pattern for French cities.
Among the 922 US metropolitan and micropolitan areas for the 1990s, only one (Las Vegas) of
the ten fastest growing cities and none of the ten
fastest declining cities had a 1990 population
above 200,000. A similar pattern emerges for
the 232 French urban areas. Only one city in the
top ten (Nice) and one in the bottom ten (St.
Etienne) had a 1990 population above 100,000.
Thus, smaller cities seem to experience larger
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mi ⫹ 1 n ⫹ 1 ⫺ m ⫺ i
⫽
.
mi
n⫺1⫺i

It is convenient to note that for any continuous
distribution m(i), the local Zipf’s coefficient,
(i), estimated in a log Population–log Rank
plot is such that (⭸m(i)/⭸i)(i/m(i)) ⫽ ⫺1 ⫺
(i).21 The discrete equivalent of this expression
for the sequence mi is
(32)

 共i兲 ⬇ ⫺1 ⫺

mi ⫹ 1 ⫺ mi 共m ⫺ 3兲i ⫺ n ⫹ 1
⫽
.
mi /i
n⫺1⫺i

For small cities, the Zipf’s coefficient is low,
which corresponds to a quasi-flat Zipf’s curve
(recall that n Ⰷ m implies m2 ⬇ m1 through
equation (26)). As larger cities are considered,
the Zipf’s coefficient increases (⭸/⭸i ⬎ 0). Put
differently, the steady-state Zipf’s curve is concave with a Zipf’s coefficient below one in the
lower tail and above one in the upper tail.
The intuition for this result is the following.
If cities were to gain or lose industries with a
21

This corresponds to a local approximation by a power
law. For instance, when Zipf’s law is verified, the probability distribution function follows m(i) ⫽ ai⫺2, where a is
a positive constant (and the counter cumulative is classically
ai⫺1). Then, it can be readily verified that (i) ⫽  ⫽ 1.
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probability proportional to their size, this would
imply Zipf’s law (Gabaix 1999; Duranton 2006).
As shown above, the model here deviates from
this well-known benchmark because the chances
of losing an industry increase more than proportionately with city size while the chances of gaining an industry increase less than proportionately.
These two features lead to a steady state, which
is less skewed than Zipf’s law in the upper tail.
This prediction of a concave Zipf’s curve is not
counterfactual. A concave Zipf’s curve is indeed observed for the 922 US metropolitan and
micropolitan areas and for the 232 French urban
areas (see Figure 3, panels A and B, below, for
graphical representations). This feature is also
observed in many other countries (Kenneth
Rosen and Mitchell Resnick 1980; Kwok Tong
Soo 2005) and it holds at the world level (Henderson and Hyoung Gun Wang 2005).
Finally, with all industries being symmetric
and having only one location, an obvious prediction of the model is that larger cities should
host more industries. Indeed, small cities tend to
be highly specialized in their manufacturing
employment, while large cities are more diversified (Black and Henderson 2003).
In conclusion, the model is successful at replicating the three stylized facts mentioned in the
introduction. Furthermore, there is also some
empirical support for its other predictions.
IV. Simulations and Quantitative Predictions

With the model able to match many qualitative features of existing city size distributions,
the important issue at this stage is to know how
good an approximation it provides in quantitative terms. Because the steady state of the probability distribution explored above is just a limit
case, a quantitative evaluation may be carried
out only by means of Monte Carlo simulations.
The size distributions of cities for France in
1999 and for the United States in 2000 are used
as benchmarks.
To perform these simulations, recall that only
two parameters must be exogenously set, m and
n. To limit the number of degrees of freedom,
the values for these two parameters should be
obtained from the empirical distributions. Regarding the number of cities, m, the data for
both countries are quasi-exhaustive, so that
mFrance ⫽ 232 and mUS ⫽ 922. Obtaining a
value for the number of industries, n, is more
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difficult. The procedure to derive n from the
data is detailed in Appendix B. It relies on the
idea that the system is close to its steady state
and thus the smallest cities have only one industry. This procedure yields nFrance ⫽ 1,500
and nUS ⫽ 12,820 (or a population per industry
of 22,800 in France and 20,400 in the United
States).
For both sets of parameters, 1,000 sequences
of simulations are run. Each sequence takes
place as follows. Initially the n industries are
distributed across the m cities proportionately to
their existing population.22 In the US case, this
allocation implies 898 industries for “New
York,” 606 for “Los Angeles,” etc. Then, note
that the only events of interest are the crossindustry innovations, because own-industry innovations leave the distribution of city sizes
unchanged. It is therefore convenient to redefine
the time scale and discretize it so that consecutive cross-industry innovations occur at consecutive dates. This “normalization” is without loss
of generality, since the previous section showed
that the rate of innovation did not affect the
steady state. At the first date, the first “innovating”
industry is picked at random, with all industries
equally likely to innovate. Its corresponding “innovated” industry is also drawn from the pool of
(mobile) second-nature industries. The innovated
industry then relocates to the city of the innovating
industry. The process is repeated for subsequent
dates. By simulating a large number of innovations (e.g., one million), one can check that the
steady state is reached, since any number of extra
draws (e.g., 10,000) has only a minimal effect on
the average Zipf’s coefficient for the 1,000 distributions (less than 0.01).
Each sequence of simulations thus yields a
fictitious population for each city. After ranking
cities by decreasing log size within each sequence, the mean log size across simulations is
computed for each rank. This quantity can then be
plotted and compared to the empirical Zipf’s
curve. Panels A and B in Figure 3 represent the
results for France and the United States. In both
cases, the fit is good, albeit seemingly better for
the United States than for France. These two panels also plot the 5- and 95-percent confidence
22
Each city receives, first, the integer part of the ratio of its
population by the size of an industry (22,800 for France in
1999 and 20,400 for the United States in 2000). The remaining
industries are allocated according to the largest remainder.
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Panel D. US

Panel E. France
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FIGURE 3. BASELINE SIMULATIONS
Notes: Panels A and B plot the actual distributions of city sizes, Zipf’s law, the mean rank-size distributions from the
simulations, and their 5- and 95-percent confidence bands for France and the United States, respectively. Panels C and D plot
the actual observations for the normalized growth rates of French and US cities during the 1990s against their 1990
populations, the nonparametric estimations of these growth patterns (labelled NP), the mean growth rates for each size from
the simulations, and their 5- and 95-percent confidence bands. Panels E and F plot the actual observations for the normalized
squared-growth of cities during the 1990s against their 1990 populations, the nonparametric estimations of these (labelled
NP), the mean-squared growth for each size from the simulations, and their 95-percent confidence band. The 5-percent
confidence band is 0 throughout for both countries.
Source: US Census Bureau (1990 and 2000 Censuses), INSEE (1990 and 1999 Censuses), and author’s simulations.
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bands. These bands give an indication of the variation generated by the model. Their interpretation
in terms of statistical test should be downplayed,
since by construction no simulated city has a population below 20,000 (because of fixed industry
size), while this is the case for actual French and
US cities at the bottom of the distribution. Hence,
the smallest simulated cities (with only one industry) always lie outside the confidence bands.
To evaluate more precisely how well the
model fits the data, the empirical variances for
log city sizes, varFrance for 1999 and varUS for
2000, are first computed. Then, the mean squared
differences between the actual distribution and the
mean simulated distribution, msdFrance and msdUS
for the same dates, are computed in the following
fashion:
(33) msd ⫽

1
m

冘 关Actual log Size共j兲
m

j⫽1

⫺ Mean log Simulated Size共j兲兴2,
where j is the rank of cities. Finally, the R2 is
calculated according to R2 ⫽ 1 ⫺ msd/var. Like
for the R2 used in regression analysis, it takes a
value of 100 percent when the mean simulated
values reproduce exactly the actual values and a
value of 0 when the mean simulated values are
all equal. However, unlike “regression R2,”
which result from an optimization, the R2 used
here can be negative.23
As an alternative to the model (though it
ignores industry churning), Zipf’s law can be
evaluated in the same way. Under Zipf’s law,
the expected distribution of city sizes on a log
size–log rank plot is a straight line of slope ⫺1.
It should therefore be that the population in a
“Zipf urban system” is the same as that of the
empirical urban system it seeks to replicate.
These two features are enough to characterize a
counterfactual Zipf urban system. Thus, the fit
of Zipf’s law can be evaluated without simulations. The Zipf counterfactuals for France and
the United States are also plotted in Figure 3,
panels A and B.
23

Negative R2 occur when the variance of the difference
between the empirical distribution and the simulations is
greater than the variance in the empirical distribution. This
can happen if the largest simulated city becomes much
larger than its empirical counterpart.
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For France, the R2 of the simulations is a
satisfactory 85 percent. Zipf’s law nonetheless
does better since its R2 is 97 percent. This last
result is not very surprising since the OLS Zipf
coefficient for France is ⫺0.97 with a regression R2 of 98 percent. Interestingly, the simulated Zipf’s curves are concave like the French
Zipf’s curve, though more so. For the United
States, the performance of the simulations is
better than in the French case, with an R2 of 91
percent. This is also better than Zipf’s law
(R2 ⫽ 89 percent). The simulated Zipf’s curves
also replicate the concavity of the US Zipf’s
curve but exaggerate it again.
In a nutshell, in a log size–log rank plot, the
Zipf’s curve generated by Zipf’s law are “too
straight” while those generated by the model are
too concave. Since the US Zipf’s curve is more
concave than the French, the model does better
in this former case and worse in the latter. Note
finally that because industries are symmetric,
the simulated Zipf’s curves are stepwise continuous in their lower tail. Having some heterogeneity in industry sizes would, of course, get
rid of this counterfactual property, since the
smallest cities would no longer bunch at the
employment size of the representative industry.
Introducing some heterogeneity in industry employment could also introduce the possibility of
more dispersion in the upper tail when a number
of large industries locate in the same city. This
realistic extension would, however, require a
very detailed estimation of industry size heterogeneity and is best left for future work.
Simulations are also useful to examine how
well the model can replicate other moments of
existing city size distributions, namely the
growth and variance of French and US cities
during the 1990s. The simulations here are constructed as follow. For each country, industries
are initially distributed across cities proportionately to their size in 1990. Then a series of
cross-industry innovations is drawn and the
simulations proceed as before. A key question,
of course, is how many shocks to draw. I assume that a third of industries are hit by crossindustry innovations (i.e., 500 industry shocks
for France and 4,270 for the United States). This
is a conservative figure, since for the United
States between 1987 and 1997, the average of
the index of reallocation across sectors and cities, Churnc (calculated over a ten-year interval
instead of annual intervals as in equation (1)),
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net of population growth is around 40 percent.
These simulations are repeated 1,000 times. For
each simulated city, the initial and final sizes are
compared to compute the growth rate and its
square. Then, the mean growth of cities for each
initial size, as well as the 5- and 95-percent
confidence bands, can be nonparametrically estimated. This information is plotted in Figure 3
(panel C for France and panel D for the United
States). These two figures also plot the (normalized) growth of all cities and a nonparametric
estimate of the empirical growth-size relationship for France and the United States. The exercise is then repeated for the variance. It is
plotted in Figure 3, panels E and F.
The important conclusion here is that a rate of
sectoral reallocation across cities of a third per
decade yields (more than) enough variation to
be consistent with the observed patterns of
growth. In Figure 3 (panels C to F), only very
few cities are outside the confidence bands. For
France, only five cities in 232 had a rate of
growth outside the bands, while only two had
too large a variance. For the simulated US sizegrowth relationship, the number of cities outside the bands is larger but still well below 5
percent (26 in 933), while only four cities were
outside the variance bands.24
V. Adding Urban Features to the Benchmark

The main drawback of the model in Section II
is its simplistic modeling of cities with neither
costs nor benefits to size. This fits uneasily with
the large literature documenting that cities face
a trade-off between various forms of agglomeration economies and crowding costs.25
24

Using the same R2 approach as previously, the performance of the model can be compared to that of Gibrat’s law
(i.e., all cities face a random growth process with the same
mean and variance), which is the most popular growth process
underlying Zipf’s law. For both growth and variance, the
model has a better performance than Gibrat’s law for French
cities and a slightly worse performance for US cities, reversing
the results above regarding the steady-state distribution. Not
too much emphasis should be put on this comparison, since the
differences stem mostly from the lower tail. The high growth
and variance in the French lower tail is better captured by the
model, whereas the lower growth and variance in the US lower
tail is better captured by Gibrat’s law.
25
See Duranton and Puga (2004) for a recent survey of
the theoretical literature, and Rosenthal and Strange (2004)
for a review of its empirical counterpart. A single location
for each industry could, however, be interpreted as agglom-
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Adding agglomeration economies in final
production would make labor more efficient in
larger cities, while crowding costs would make
it more costly. The profit of monopolists may
increase or decrease depending on which force
dominates. Monopoly profits then determine the
incentives for research firms to invest, which in
turn affect the growth of cities. Agglomeration
economies in research would have a more direct
effect and make research labor more innovative
in larger cities, while crowding costs would
make it more costly.
To solve the model with agglomeration economies, one would need to derive a solution to
the size-innovation relationship accounting for
these features. Because of worker mobility, general equilibrium effects imply that the expected
growth of any city depends (nonlinearly) on the
entire distribution of city sizes so that no closedform solution can be obtained.26
Instead, the objective of this section is more
modest. I consider a reduced form, whereby the
probability of an innovation taking place in a
city with i industries in steady state is proportional to i ⫻ (i), where (i) is the innovativeness of the city relative to its size. This reduced
form can encapsulate any trade-off between agglomeration economies in research and crowding costs. Crowding costs alone imply (i)⬘ ⬍
0, whereas agglomeration economies in research alone imply (i)⬘ ⬎ 0.27 Since this func-

eration economies within industries (a.k.a. localization
economies).
26
Because of the complex stochastic forward-looking
nature of the dynamics, even simulations are well beyond
the scope of this paper. To see this, note that the underlying
dynamics is non-Markov in the sense that the growth of a
city between t and t ⫹ ⌬t affects its expected growth
between t ⫹ ⌬t and t ⫹ 2⌬t, etc. In turn, this affects ex ante
investment.
27
This exercise is “partial” since agglomeration economies in production are ignored (or assumed to cancel out
directly with crowding costs). This omission is not as important as it seems. First, with agglomeration effects, the
level of employment in industries will depend on the size of
the city. With each industry receiving a constant share of
expenditure and modest agglomeration economies, this effect is unlikely to be large. Second, agglomeration economies in production affect the profit of monopolists and thus
the incentive to invest in research. This second effect can be
ignored since it is redundant with the direct effect of agglomeration economies in research. Finally, note that ignoring agglomeration effects in production makes it possible to
focus the simulations on the key function (i), without
introducing too many degrees of freedom.
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TABLE 2—SUMMARY STATISTICS

FOR THE

SIMULATIONS

France
⫽0
 ⫽ 0.005
 ⫽ 0.01
 ⫽ 0.02
 ⫽ 0.025
 ⫽ 0.03
 ⫽ 0.04
 ⫽ 0.05
Zipf’s law
Empirical values

MARCH 2007

United States

100

232

R2 (percent)

100

232

R2 (percent)

1.28
1.25
1.21
1.15
1.09
1.07
1.04
1.04
1.00
1.02

0.83
0.84
0.84
0.85
0.95
1.02
1.11
1.17
1.00
0.97

85
88
89
92
97
92
80
67
97
—

1.49
1.40
1.22
1.11
1.07
1.04
1.00
0.96
1.00
1.07

0.71
0.73
0.88
1.09
1.16
1.23
1.35
1.44
1.00
0.82

91
93
80
44
30
16
⫺5
⫺25
89
—

Notes: Empirical values are for 1999 (France) and 2000 (United States). The  coefficients reported in the different columns
are estimated as in equation (5) for the number of cities in subindex. The R2 are evaluated as described above.

tion, (i), is not derived explicitly from an
underlying model, some external information
should be used for calibration purposes.
Unfortunately different proxies for urban innovativeness (such as patenting per capita, rates
of firm creation, or various measure of city
education) give fairly different estimates for
(i).28 It is thus better to take values for (i) that
are within an empirically plausible range and
look at how changes in (i) affect the steadystate distribution, instead of using a particular
data source and a “carefully selected” estimate
for the size-innovation relationship. In their review of the empirical literature, Rosenthal and
Strange (2004) argue that most estimates for
agglomeration economies imply an elasticity of
productivity to size in the 3- to 8-percent range.
These estimates concern gross agglomeration
economies. After taking crowding costs into
account, a 0- to 5-percent range is probably
realistic for net agglomeration economies.
28
Patenting (i.e., average number of utility patents per
capita between 1990 and 1999 for US metropolitan areas
from the US Patent and Trademark Office) is arguably the
best proxy, but the estimates are sensitive to the chosen
functional form. This is in part because there is a peak of
innovativeness for population between half a million and a
million (the five most innovative US cities are San Jose,
California; Boulder, Colorado; Rochester, New York; and
Saginaw and Ann Harbor, Michigan). Looking at firm creation leads to the same broad pattern (a per capita increase
with city size that tails off for larger cities), but the elasticities are much smaller (around 1 to 2 percent as opposed to
10 percent or more). The proportion of university graduates
in the city work force also implies high elasticities, whereas
for the average years of education the elasticities are much
smaller.

Using the same simulation approach as previously, the effect of agglomeration economies
in research net of crowding costs can be assessed quantitatively. The only difference with
the baseline simulations is that the probability
of a city generating an innovation is no longer
proportional to its size, but rather is proportional to its size times (i) ⫽ i, with  being
allowed to vary over the 0- to 5-percent range.
The parameter  captures net dynamic economies of scale: the probability of innovating
within a given industry increases by 1 ⫹ 
percent when the size of its city increases by 1
percent.
An increase in net agglomeration economies
in research, , makes larger cities more likely to
innovate relative to smaller cities. Hence, the
expected growth of larger cities relative to
smaller cities should increases with . As a
result, the steady-state distribution should become more skewed in the upper tail. Smaller
cities will also find it more difficult to grow so
that there should be more of them in steady
state.
This is exactly what we observe in the simulations. A summary of the results is given in
Table 2. As  increases, the upper tail becomes
more skewed, as shown by the decline of the
Zipf’s coefficients for the upper tails (100 for
France and 150 for the United States). As 
increases, there are also more smaller cities.
This implies a higher Zipf’s coefficient for the
lower tail. Given that there are many more
cities in the lower tail than in the upper tail,
the second effect dominates and a rise in 
leads to higher Zipf’s coefficients for the entire
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Panel B. US:
Simulated and actual city size distributions

Panel A. France:
Simulated and actual city size distributions

French distribution

Simulations:
confidence bands

Simulations: mean

log Pop

FIGURE 4. SIMULATIONS

WITH

SCALE EFFECTS

IN INNOVATION

Notes: The figures plot the actual distributions of city sizes, the mean rank-size distributions from the augmented simulations,
and their 5- and 95-percent confidence bands for France and the United States, respectively. Panel A was produced with 232
cities, 1,500 industries each with 22,800 workers, and  ⫽ 0.025. Panel B was produced with 932 cities, 12,820 industries
each with 20,400 workers, and  ⫽ 0.007 ⫹ 0.05/i0.2.
Source: US Census Bureau (2000 Census), INSEE (1999 Census), and author’s simulations.

distributions (232 for France and 922 for the
United States). Further increases in  lead to
some convexity in the upper tail and further
reductions of the concavity in the lower tail.
Since the baseline case ( ⫽ 0) generated
overly concave Zipf’s curves, a positive  may
thus improve on the performance of the baseline. For France, the best fit is obtained for  ⫽
2.5 percent. With this value of , the performance of the simulations is better than that of
Zipf’s law. With R2 ⫽ 97.2 percent, there is
little room for improvement because the lumpiness of industries makes it impossible to get an
R2 above 98.5 percent. Panel A of Figure 4
shows that the mean simulation is indeed very
close to its empirical counterpart. It also shows
that all French cities with a population above
30,000 are within the confidence bands of the
simulations. For the United States, the R2 is
maximized for  ⫽ 0.5 percent, offering only a
modest improvement on the baseline case. The
reason is that, with further increases of , the
largest city in the simulations becomes too large
in comparison to New York. Because of the
large number of second-nature industries in our
simulated US urban system, even a small degree
of unmitigated agglomeration economies can
lead to a very large dominant city. This problem

is avoided by allowing (realistically) for agglomeration effects to tail off when cities get
very large. For  ⫽ 0.007 ⫹ 0.05/i0.2, the R2 for
the entire US distribution is 96 percent, and
above 99 percent for the 300 largest cities. This
functional form corresponds to net economies
of agglomeration of about 6 percent for the
smallest cities and about 2 percent for a city the
size of New York. Panel B of Figure 4 shows
that these simulations are indeed very close to
the US urban system.
In conclusion, these richer simulations show
that the model can accommodate important features of cities that were hitherto ignored. Interestingly, for empirically plausible values of
agglomeration effects, the simulations can get
very close to existing urban systems.29

29
One should not attempt, however, to read too much
into these simulations. In particular, agglomeration effects
cannot be precisely identified by applying a maximum likelihood approach to the simulations. First, the confidence
bands get fairly wide for the largest cities. Second, higher
net agglomeration economies in the upper tail can be compensated by even higher agglomeration economies in the
lower tail to yield very similar distributions of cities sizes.
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VI. Concluding Comments

To summarize, the contributions of this paper
are the following. First, it provides a simple
mechanism (innovation-driven shocks at the
level of industries and cities) to explain the
growth and decline of cities. This model is able
to replicate three major stylized facts about urban evolutions: the fast, the slow, and the still.
Through simulations, it can also replicate effectively various moments of the French and US
city size distributions. Second, this paper shows
that the fit of the model is improved when
APPENDIX A: STEADY STATE
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standard urban features like agglomeration
economies and crowding costs are considered.
The last contribution of the paper is more subtle. Replicating existing patterns of city size
distributions may not be as difficult as previously thought. This implies that the real test to
distinguish between different mechanisms like
the one highlighted here, that of Gabaix (1999),
and any potential alternative is not whether they
can replicate observed patterns. Instead the key
issue regards the empirical importance of these
mechanisms as determinants of the growth of
cities.

OF THE

PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION

The number mi of cities of size i ⱖ 2 grows by two units when a second-nature industry located in a
city of size i ⫹ 1 is successfully improved by a research firm located in a city of size i ⫺ 1. Since there
are n(n ⫺ 1) possible cross-industry innovations, imi⫹1 second-nature industries in cities of size i ⫹ 1,
and (i ⫺ 1)m i ⫺ 1 potential sources of innovations in cities of size i ⫺ 1, this event occurs with
probability
(A1)

关im i ⫹ 1 兴 ⫻ 关共i ⫺ 1兲m i ⫺ 1 兴
,
n共n ⫺ 1兲

conditionally on a cross-industry innovation taking place. Then, mi grows by one unit when an
industry relocates from a city of size i ⫹ 1 to a (different) city of any size, except i and i ⫺ 1. Since
there are imi ⫹ 1 industries that can be captured this way by n ⫺ (i ⫹ 1) ⫺ imi ⫺ (i ⫺ 1)mi ⫺ 1
industries, this event takes place with the conditional probability
(A2)

关im i ⫹ 1 兴 ⫻ 关n ⫺ i ⫺ 1 ⫺ im i ⫺ 共i ⫺ 1兲m i ⫺ 1 兴
.
n共n ⫺ 1兲

Finally, mi also increases by one unit when research in a city of size i ⫺ 1 successfully improves a
second-nature industry located in a different city of any size but i and i ⫹ 1. Since there are (i ⫺
1)mi ⫺ 1 industries in cities of size i ⫺ 1 that can capture one of n ⫺ m ⫺ (i ⫺ 2) ⫺ (i ⫺ 1)mi ⫺ imi ⫹ 1
industries, this event takes place with the conditional probability
(A3)

关n ⫺ m ⫺ 共i ⫺ 2兲 ⫺ 共i ⫺ 1兲m i ⫺ im i ⫹ 1 兴 ⫻ 关共i ⫺ 1兲m i ⫺ 1 兴
.
n共n ⫺ 1兲

The number mi of cities of size i ⱖ 2 decreases by two units when a second-nature industry located
in a city of size i is successfully improved by a research firm located in another city of size i. Since
there are imi industries that can capture one of (i ⫺ 1)(mi ⫺ 1) industries, the conditional probability
of this event is
(A4)

关共i ⫺ 1兲共m i ⫺ 1兲兴 ⫻ 关im i 兴
.
n共n ⫺ 1兲

Then, mi declines by one unit when an industry relocates from a city of size i to a city of any size
except i and i ⫺ 1. With (i ⫺ 1)mi industries that can be captured this way by n ⫺ imi ⫺ (i ⫺ 1)mi ⫺ 1
industries, this event takes place with the conditional probability
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关共i ⫺ 1兲m i 兴 ⫻ 关n ⫺ im i ⫺ 共i ⫺ 1兲m i ⫺ 1 兴
.
n共n ⫺ 1兲

(A5)

Finally, mi also decreases by one unit when research in a city of size i successfully improves a
second-nature industry located in a city of any size but i and i ⫹ 1. Since there are imi industries in
cities of size i that can capture one of n ⫺ m ⫺ (i ⫺ 1)mi ⫺ imi ⫹ 1 industries, this event takes place
with the conditional probability
关n ⫺ m ⫺ 共i ⫺ 1兲m i ⫺ im i ⫹ 1 兴 ⫻ 关im i 兴
.
n共n ⫺ 1兲

(A6)

Using (A1)–(A6), the steady-state condition (23) for i ⱖ 2 yields equation (27) in the text. The
general solution to the sequence defined by (27), mi ⫹ 1 ⫽ {[(2i ⫺ 1)n ⫺ im ⫺ 2i(i ⫺ 1)]mi ⫺ (i ⫺
1)(n ⫺ m ⫺ i ⫹ 2)mi ⫺ 1}/[i(n ⫺ i ⫺ 1)], is
mi ⫽

(A7)

⌫共n ⫺ 2兲 ⌫共n ⫺ m ⫺ i ⫹ 1兲
m1 .
⌫共n ⫺ m兲 ⌫共n ⫺ i ⫺ 1兲

A well-known property of ⌫-functions is ⌫(x) ⫽ (x ⫺ 1)⌫( x ⫺ 1). Using this property in equation
(A7) yields, after simplification,

写

j ⫽ m⫺2

mi ⫽ m1

(A8)

j⫽1

n⫹1⫺m⫺i⫹j
.
n⫺m⫹j

(For i ⫽ 2, it is easy to verify that equation (A8) boils down to equation (26). For i ⱖ 2, it can also
be verified that mi ⫹ 1, mi , and mi ⫺ 1, as derived from (A8), satisfy equation (27).)
To derive m1, it must be noted first that summing industries across all possible sizes for cities from
1 (the smallest) to m ⫺ n ⫹ 1 (the largest) implies ¥in⫽⫺1m ⫹ 1 mi ⫽ m. Using equation (A8) then yields

冘

i ⫽ n⫺m ⫹ 1

(A9)

m⫽

i⫽1

冘

i ⫽ n⫺m ⫹ 1

mi ⫽ m1

i⫽1

冉写

j ⫽ m⫺2

j⫽1

冊

n⫹1⫺m⫺i⫹j
.
n⫺m⫹j

To simplify this expression, it is convenient to define the series s0 ⫽ 0 and si ⫽ mi ⫹ si ⫺ 1 for all
i ⱖ 1. The general solution to this series is
(A10)

si ⫽

n⫺1
n ⫺ i ⫺ 1 ⌫共n ⫺ i ⫺ 1兲 ⌫共n ⫺ m ⫹ 1兲
m1 ⫺
m .
m⫺1
m⫺1
⌫共n ⫺ 1兲 ⌫共n ⫺ m ⫹ 1 ⫺ i兲 1

For the largest possible city size, i ⫽ n ⫺ m ⫹ 1, we have ⌫(n ⫺ m ⫹ 1 ⫺ i) ⫽ ⌫(0) ⫽ ⫹⬁, so that
the last term in equation (A10) is zero. Consequently, this yields
(A11)

s n ⫺ m⫹1 ⫽

n⫺1
m ,
m⫺1 1

since, by definition, sn ⫺ m⫹1 ⫽ m, m1 is given by
(A12)

m1 ⫽

m共m ⫺ 1兲
.
n⫺1

Finally, inserting equation (A12) into (A8) yields equation (28) in the text.
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APPENDIX B: SIMULATIONS: DERIVING

AN

EMPIRICAL VALUE

MARCH 2007
FOR N

Note first that equation (A12) can be rewritten as
1
1
⫽
.
n m共m ⫺ 1兲
⫹1
m1

(B1)

Then, assume that the smallest m1 cities in the empirical distribution have only a single industry.
Denote Size(m1) the average size of the m1 smallest cities in the distribution. In this case, the
model implies that Size(m1), which is also the size of an industry, is such that Size(m1) ⫻ n ⫽
Pop, where Pop denotes the overall urban population. Inserting this equality into (B1) implies that
m1 can finally be computed as the (empirical) fixed-point of
Size共m 1 兲 ⫽

(B2)

Pop
.
m共m ⫺ 1兲
⫹1
m1

In France, the population of the 232 largest cities is 34.2 m. The 36 smallest cities have an average
population of circa 22,800. These numbers approximately verify equation (B2) (subject to the integer
constraint regarding the number of cities). We thus obtain nFrance ⫽ 1,500. For the United States, the
overall urban population of the 922 largest areas is 261.5 m. The average population of the 66
smallest areas is around 20,400. Again these numbers approximately verify equation (B2). They
imply nUS ⫽ 12,820.
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